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THE ARTFUL DODGERS: SECURITIES FRAUD, ARTFUL 
PLEADING, AND PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CAUSES OF 




Although a main component of the regulatory scheme established by 
Congress to monitor the national securities markets is oversight and 
enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), private 
shareholder litigation also has an important role to play in ensuring 
corporate accountability.1  In an attempt to balance the policing and 
deterrence roles of private shareholder litigation with the interests of 
corporate actors in minimizing the threat of perpetual securities fraud 
litigation, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 (PSLRA) and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
of 1998 (SLUSA).  The PSLRA imposes procedural burdens on 
securities class actions, and SLUSA precludes certain securities class 
actions from being brought in state court if the complaint alleges a 
misrepresentation or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities. 
Because SLUSA’s language does not limit its preemptive scope to 
formally pled fraud claims, a gray area has developed regarding how far 
SLUSA should be interpreted to preclude various state law causes of 
action where the plaintiff has alleged fraudulent conduct in the 
complaint.  Furthermore, plaintiffs’ lawyers have found creative ways to 
circumvent SLUSA—and thereby thwart the objectives of the PSLRA—
through “artful pleading.”2  The federal circuit courts have developed 
different standards for evaluating the nuances of the complaint to 
determine if the lawsuit is precluded by SLUSA, and, having made such 
a determination, whether and how to allow the non-precluded state law 
 
  Associate Member, 2011–2012; Executive Editor, 2012–2013 University of Cincinnati Law 
Review. 
 1. See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 
497 (1997) (“The class action thereby has an important deterrent feature which give [sic] it a quasi-
public character; it can thus be seen as an extension of the state’s enforcement arm and an expression of 
society’s will.”). 
 2. The artful pleading doctrine states that “a plaintiff cannot frustrate a defendant’s right to 
remove by pleading a case without reference to any federal law when the plaintiff’s claim is necessarily 
federal.”  CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722 
(4th ed. 2012).  A state law claim that is completely preempted by federal law may be removed to 
federal court even if the complaint asserts only state law claims.  16–107 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.14[4][b][iv] (2012). 
1
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claims to proceed.  Because these different standards are contrary to 
SLUSA’s objective of maintaining uniform standards for private 
securities actions, the circuit split must be resolved by either adopting 
one approach or combining the approaches into a consistent standard.  
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the history of private 
securities litigation and discusses the substance and policy rationales of 
the PSLRA and SLUSA.  Part III addresses both the varying standards 
adopted by the circuit courts in analyzing the pleadings to determine 
whether SLUSA applies to preempt state law claims, as well as the 
courts’ different approaches regarding how a claim should proceed to 
disposition when SLUSA is deemed to apply to some or all of the 
claims.  Part IV argues that the Third Circuit’s approach is best suited to 
promote the objectives of the PSLRA and SLUSA while properly 
leaving purely state law causes of action outside of SLUSA’s 
preemptive scope.  Part V concludes the Comment. 
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: PRIVATE ACTIONS, PSLRA, AND SLUSA 
A. Securities Regulation and Private Rights of Action 
In response to the collapse of the stock market in 1929, Congress 
exacted the Securities Act of 19333 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.4 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use of “any 
manipulative or deceptive practice or contrivance in contravention” of 
the rules promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
pursuant to the Act.5  SEC Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for  
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, (a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact 
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.6 
Although the 1934 Act grants authority to the SEC to bring civil actions 
in federal court to enforce the Act and the SEC’s rules,7 the federal 
courts have recognized an implied right of individuals to seek redress 
 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012). 
 4. Id. § 78a.  
 5. Id. § 78j(b). 
 6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A) (2010). 
2
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for securities fraud.8  However, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that litigation under Rule 
10b-5 presented “a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in 
kind from that which accompanies litigation in general.”9  The Court 
explained that even objectively baseless claims may force companies to 
settle if the pending lawsuit has the potential to “frustrate or delay 
normal business activity.”10  These settlement amounts may be 
disproportionate to the plaintiff’s likelihood of success at trial.11  Such 
lawsuits are referred to as “nuisance suits” or “strike suits.”12 
B. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
In 1995, Congress adopted the PSLRA13 to address “perceived abuses 
of the class-action vehicle in litigation involving nationally traded 
securities.”14  These abuses included reflexive filing of lawsuits in 
response to dramatic fluctuations in stock prices, extortionate use of 
discovery rules “with only faint hope that the discovery process might 
lead eventually to some plausible cause of action,” targeting of “deep 
pocket defendants . . . without regard to their actual culpability,” and 
manipulation of class representatives by plaintiffs’ attorneys.15  These 
practices dissuaded qualified persons from serving on corporate boards, 
chilled corporations’ disclosure of future prospects, and interfered with 
the raising of capital, thereby harming investors, issuers, and the 
national economy at large.16 
 
 8. Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 79 (2006).  The existence of an implied right of action 
was proposed in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Penn. 1946), where Judge 
Kirkpatrick argued that Congress’ failure to expressly deny an individual right of action meant that 
private individuals were not prevented from bringing suit to enforce the “broad purpose[s]” of the act: 
the regulation of securities transactions and the “elimination of all manipulative or deceptive practices in 
such transactions.”  The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed this view in Superintendent of Insurance v. 
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is now established that a private right of 
action is implied under § 10(b).”).  See also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964) 
(recognizing a private right of action for violation of the SEC’s rules governing proxy solicitations). 
 9. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975) (holding that private civil 
remedies for money damages from violations of Rule 10b-5 are limited to “purchasers or sellers of 
securities.”). 
 10. Id. at 740.  A primary concern is the cost of discovery, due to the need for extensive 
depositions of corporate officers and examination of business documents inherent in securities litigation. 
Id. at 741.  This “permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of a 
number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement 
value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evidence . . . .”  Id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1998). 
 14. Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006). 
 15. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369 (1995). 
 16. See id.; see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act—Major Developments and Issues, 
3
Kendall: The Artful Dodgers: Securities Fraud, Artful Pleading, and Preemp
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
660 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
To protect corporations and their personnel from extortionate and 
frivolous lawsuits, the PSLRA implemented a number of procedural 
hurdles that apply to private plaintiff class actions brought pursuant to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.17  A large portion of the statute is 
directed towards regulating the conduct of plaintiffs’ attorneys.  To 
protect plaintiffs from manipulation by plaintiffs’ counsel, the statute 
requires a sworn certification by the representative plaintiff.18  The 
certification must, inter alia, state that the plaintiff has authorized the 
filing of the complaint, state that the plaintiff did not purchase the 
security in question at the direction of plaintiffs’ counsel, identify the 
transactions that are the subject of the litigation, identify any class 
actions filed by the same plaintiff in the previous three years, and state 
that the plaintiff is not accepting any payment for serving as the class 
representative beyond the plaintiff’s pro rata share of any recovery.19  
Additionally, the PSLRA includes a mandatory analysis of whether the 
suit is frivolous under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.20  Although the PSLRA does 
not alter Rule 11’s standards, it requires the court “upon final 
adjudication of the action,” to “include in the record specific findings” 
regarding compliance with Rule 11.21 
The PSLRA also establishes a heightened pleading standard, its “most 
significant and most heavily litigated provision.”22  This standard 
exceeds the already heightened standard for pleading fraud or mistake 
under the Federal Rules23 by requiring plaintiffs to “specify each 
statement alleged to have been misleading, and the reason or reasons 
why the statement is misleading.”24  The plaintiff must state with 
particularity “facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant 
acted with the required state of mind” with regards to an act or 
omission.25 Plaintiffs asserting allegations based on “information or 
 
27 SEC. LITIG.: FORMS & ANALYSIS § 1:2 (2011) [hereinafter Major Developments and Issues]. 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2010).  For the basic requirements governing federal class actions, 
see FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2). 
 19. Id.  The statute also establishes requirements for selection of lead plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ 
counsel and sets limitations on attorney’s fees and recovery by lead plaintiffs. 
 20. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) states that the presentation of pleadings, motions or other papers to the 
court certifies to the court that pleadings, written motions, briefs and other papers are “not being 
presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase 
the cost of litigation.” 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1). 
 22. Major Developments and Issues, supra note 16, § 1:2. 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) requires a party alleging fraud or mistake to “state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).  This is the “scienter” requirement.  Scienter is defined as a 
“mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.”  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).  Thus, “[m]erely pleading facts establishing that a defendant had the motive 
4
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belief” must “state with particularity all the facts on which that belief is 
formed.”26  Finally, plaintiffs must also plead “loss causation” by 
proving that “the act or omission of the defendant alleged to have 
violated this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to 
recover damages.”27 
To reduce extortionate discovery requests, the PSLRA provides for a 
stay of discovery pending any motion to dismiss, unless discovery is 
necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to a 
party.28  This provision protects defendants from the burdens of 
discovery costs in cases that are potentially groundless (and therefore 
likely to be dismissed).29  It also prevents plaintiffs from filing a case 
without enough information and then using discovery to obtain enough 
information to avoid dismissal.30 
Finally, the PSLRA includes a “safe harbor” provision for forward-
looking statements.  This provision eliminates liability “with respect to 
any forward-looking statement, whether written or oral, if and to the 
extent that . . . [the statement] is accompanied by meaningful cautionary 
statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results 
to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement.”31  For 
a forward-looking statement to be actionable, the plaintiff must prove 
that the statement was made with actual knowledge that it was false or 
misleading.32  Thus, the combination of the safe harbor provision and 
the higher pleading standard incentivizes plaintiffs with a case based 
solely on allegedly false forward-looking statements to file in state court 
instead of federal court.33 
Accordingly, to avoid the heightened procedural burdens imposed by 
the PSLRA, plaintiffs began bringing securities class actions in state 
 
and opportunity to commit securities fraud does not establish scienter under the Securities Act.”  Burns 
v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 917, 923 (2000) (internal quotations omitted). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B).  To circumvent this requirement, plaintiffs’ counsel would avoid 
pleading using the words “information and belief” and instead base allegations on “investigation of 
counsel” to invoke the work product privilege.  Major Developments and Issues, supra note 16, § 1:2.  
Courts have rejected this tactic because facts are not protected by the work product doctrine.  Id. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4). 
 28. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
 29. Major Developments and Issues, supra note 16, § 1:2 
 30. Id.; Lapicola v. Alt. Dual Fuels, Inc., No. 3-02-CV-0299-G, 2002 WL 531545, at *1 (N.D. 
Tex. Apr. 5, 2002) (“There are two primary purposes for the stay of discovery contained in the PSLRA: 
(1) to prevent the imposition of any unreasonable burden on a defendant before disposition of a motion 
to dismiss; and (2) to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff sues without possessing the requisite 
information to meet the heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA, then uses discovery to acquire 
that information and resuscitate a complaint that is otherwise subject to dismissal.”). 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 32. Id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(1). 
 33. Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud 
Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 298 (1998). 
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court under state securities laws.34  This resulted in a substantial increase 
in state court securities litigation based on two strategies.  In some cases, 
plaintiffs’ counsel would file state law claims if the facts appeared to not 
satisfy the heightened pleading requirements imposed by the PSLRA.35  
In other cases, plaintiffs’ counsel would file claims in both state and 
federal court simultaneously to avoid the PSLRA’s discovery stay 
provision, allowing plaintiffs to take advantage of state discovery rules 
while the federal court stayed discovery pending a motion to dismiss.36  
The combination of circumstances leading to an increase in state court 
litigation after the PSLRA was dubbed the “federal flight loophole.”37 
The shift to state court venues reopened many of the wounds the 
PSLRA was intended to close, including the effects of such class actions 
on companies’ ability to raise capital.38  The PSLRA’s safe-harbor 
provisions, intended to encourage companies to provide financial 
forecasts to investors without fear of litigation, were weakened.39  The 
state court shift subjected securities issuers to disparate standards from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction—both between federal and state law and 
between laws of different states.40  Because publicly traded companies 
cannot control where their securities are traded after the initial public 
offering, those companies also lost control over choice of venue—thus, 
“a single state [could] impose the risks and costs of its peculiar litigation 
system on all national issuers.”41 
C. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 
Congress enacted SLUSA42 to close this loophole and to prevent 
 
 34. LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2008); Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, 332 
F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Confronted with more onerous procedural requirements and dimmed 
prospects of success under the PSLRA, litigants simply abandoned use of federal court and filed suit in 
state court under state securities laws.”); S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 3 (1998).  A witness at a Senate 
committee hearing testified that state court securities class actions were “virtually unknown” prior to 
PSLRA.  Id. at 4.  Some commentators have questioned whether the federal flight problem actually 
existed to the extent Congress believed.  See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal 
Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42–45 (1998).  
Regardless of the strength of the empirical data on the federal flight phenomenon, the PSLRA’s 
heightened pleading requirements, discovery stay provision, and safe-harbor provision provided an 
incentive for plaintiffs to file in state court.  Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting 
Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 294–96 (1998). 
 35. S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 3 (1998). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Spielman, 332 F.3d at 123. 
 38. S. REP. 105-182, at 4. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 3. 
 41. S. REP. 105-182, at 5. 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2000). 
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plaintiffs from evading the PSLRA’s burdens by migrating to state 
court.43  SLUSA precludes a covered class action if: (1) the class 
consists of more than fifty members, (2) the claim is not exclusively 
derivative, (3) the claim is based on state law, and (4) the claim is 
brought by “any private party alleging a misrepresentation or omission 
of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered 
security.”44  A “covered class action” is defined as a single lawsuit in 
which damages are sought on behalf of more than fifty persons.45  A 
“covered security” is a nationally traded security listed on a regulated 
national exchange.46  A plaintiff “may pursue such a [securities fraud] 
claim either (1) as a federal securities fraud class action, or (2) as a state 
law individual action,” but “may not pursue such a claim as a state law 
class action.”47  
A state court class action that meets SLUSA’s requirements is 
removable to federal court pending termination of the proceedings.48  If 
the plaintiff moves to remand to state court on the basis that the action 
 
 43. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2774 (2012). 
 44. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1); Brown, 664 F.3d at 124.  Although many cases refer to SLUSA’s 
“preemption” of claims, the Act “does not actually ‘preempt’ causes of action, so much as it prevents 
causes of action from being asserted through the vehicle of a class action lawsuit.”  LaSala v. Bordier et 
Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 127 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also Merrill Lynch, v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 
71, 72 (2006) (“SLUSA does not pre-empt any cause of action.  It simply denies the use of the class-
action device to vindicate certain claims.”); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 4 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION, § 12.15[2][A], 294 (6th ed. 2009) (“[SLUSA] is not complete in its 
elimination of state court class actions . . . .”); Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“SLUSA is a statute of preclusion, rather than preemption.”); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust Co., 547 
U.S. 633, 636 n.1 (“The preclusion provision is often called a preemption provision; the Act, however, 
does not itself displace state law with federal law but makes some state law claims nonactionable 
through the class-action device in federal as well as state court.”).  Thus, an individual plaintiff or a 
class of fewer than fifty plaintiffs may bring such claims without problem.  See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87.  
Despite this distinction, the case law rather consistently refers to SLUSA’s effect as “preemption.”  In 
the interest of consistency with the case law, this Comment will use “preemption” to discuss SLUSA’s 
effect, with the caveat that preclusion is probably the more accurate term according to the above 
authorities. 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(b). 
 46. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 83; 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(E). 
 47. LaSala, 519 F.3d at 129.  See also Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 312 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (discussing how plaintiff could have filed on behalf of himself and up to forty-eight others, or 
filed a class action in compliance with the PSLRA).  This description of the narrow scope of SLUSA 
preclusion deserves further explanation.  The first option, bringing the suit as a federal securities fraud 
class action (pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23) would subject the suit to the requirements of the PSLRA, 
thus bringing it outside SLUSA’s loophole-closing rationale.  The second option, the state law 
individual action, would not present the extortive, abusive or manipulative tendencies of class actions 
that the PSLRA was enacted to remedy in the first place. 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2); Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 
2011).  Removal is at the option of the defendant, and in the alternative, “a defendant can elect to leave 
a case where the plaintiff filed it and trust the state court (an equally competent body) to make the 
preclusion determination.”  Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 646 (2006) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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does not meet the requirements for preclusion under SLUSA, the motion 
raises a jurisdictional issue, and neither a federal court nor a state court 
has jurisdiction over an action precluded under SLUSA.49  If SLUSA 
does not preclude the action, the federal court lacks jurisdiction over the 
merits of the case and must remand it to state court.50 
In addition to permitting removal, SLUSA grants federal courts the 
authority to stay discovery in related state court lawsuits.51  This 
provision is in response to plaintiffs’ attempts to work around the 
PSLRA’s discovery stay by using discovery materials obtained from a 
related state court action to supplement its factual claims in the federal 
case.52  This is especially a concern where the same attorney or attorneys 
represent both the state and federal plaintiffs.53  Federal courts 
considering whether to stay discovery in state court actions ask (1) 
whether there is a risk of the federal plaintiffs obtaining the state court 
plaintiffs’ discovery, (2) whether the state and federal actions contain 
overlapping claims and facts, and (3) the burden that the state court 
discovery would impose on the defendants.54  This provision gives 
 
 49. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 643–44; Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 297–98 
(2005) (“The SLUSA removal provision, § 78bb(f)(2), is jurisdictional.”).  Rowinski describes this 
removal provision as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule via the complete preemption 
doctrine.  For background on the well-pleaded complaint rule, see Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. 
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (holding that the federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction 
“only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law 
or the Constitution]”); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“[F]ederal jurisdiction 
exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 
complaint.”).  The complete preemption doctrine holds that “[o]nce an area of state law has been 
completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its 
inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.”  Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. 
 50. Id.  The circuits are split as to whether a remand order under SLUSA is reviewable on 
appeal.  Compare United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(SLUSA remand order based on district court’s perceived absence of subject matter jurisdiction not 
appealable), and Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, 332 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2002) (same), with Kircher v. 
Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2004) (determining that SLUSA’s preemptive effects mean 
that a remand decision under SLUSA is not merely jurisdictional and thus is not subject to the general 
rule against appealability of remand orders).  See also generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 4 TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, § 12.15[2][D], 306 (6th ed. 2009).  Generally, a decision to 
remand is a final appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, unless the decision is made on jurisdictional 
grounds.  Id. 
 51. 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(3)(D) (2010) (“Upon a proper showing, a court may stay discovery 
proceedings in any private action in a State court, as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or 
effectuate its judgments, in an action subject to a stay of discovery pursuant to this paragraph.”); see 
also Major Developments and Issues, supra note 16, § 1:2. 
 52. Major Developments and Issues, supra note 16, § 1:2. 
 53. See, e.g., In re DPL Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 946 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (enjoining state discovery 
after attorney representing plaintiffs in both federal and state actions indicated that he anticipated 
sharing discovery obtained in the state court proceeding with the federal plaintiffs). 
 54. See, e.g., In re Cardinal Health, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 866, 873, 877 (S.D. Ohio 2005) 
(enjoining state court discovery); In re Gilead Scis., No. C 03-4999 MJJ, 2004 WL 3712008 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 22, 2004) (declining to enjoin state court discovery applying the same factors). 
8
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plaintiffs an extra incentive to avoid SLUSA’s reach. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a presumption that SLUSA is to 
be interpreted broadly.55  In Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, the plaintiffs 
brought a state court action for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of 
contract.56  They claimed that due to the defendant corporation’s over 
appraisal of stock values and issuance of misleading research, 
stockholders held onto their overvalued securities long past the point 
where they would have sold had they known the true value of the 
stock.57  The Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment of 
dismissal, explaining that to the extent that Merrill Lynch’s actions led 
brokers to hold onto their securities rather than purchase or sell 
securities, the fraudulent conduct was not “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of” securities, and thus outside SLUSA’s preemptive 
scope.58 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  It interpreted the language 
“in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security” to mean 
that “it is enough that the fraud alleged ‘coincide’ with a securities 
transaction—whether by the plaintiff or by someone else” for SLUSA to 
apply.59 Thus, the statute preempted the plaintiffs’ “holder” claims, 
where the fraud alleged caused investors to hold on to securities as their 
true value declined—even though by definition no actual purchase or 
sale of the securities occurred during this period.60  In reaching this 
conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court explained: 
The presumption that Congress envisioned a broad construction follows 
not only from ordinary principles of statutory construction but also from 
the particular concerns that culminated in SLUSA’s enactment.  A narrow 
reading of the statute would undercut the effectiveness of the 1995 
Reform Act and thus run contrary to SLUSA’s stated purpose.61 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
SLUSA has not completely closed the federal flight loophole62 left 
open by the PSLRA.  Recently, the circuit courts have been forced to 
address attempts by plaintiffs to “‘plead around’ SLUSA by cloaking 
 
 55. See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86–87 (2006). 
 56. See id. at 75. 
 57. Id.  The plaintiffs were stockbrokers, employed by Merrill Lynch, who purchased stocks for 
themselves and for their clients using research disseminated by the company.  Id.  The stockbrokers 
claimed that Merrill Lynch breached its fiduciary duties by over appraising stock values and issuing 
misleading research, using its “misinformed brokers” to inflate the prices of clients’ stocks.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 77–78. 
 59. Id. at 85. 
 60. Id. at 86. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, 332 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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their claims with state law titles.”63  This problem arises where a 
plaintiff pleads states state law claims such as breach of contract or 
breach of fiduciary duty, but also alleges misrepresentations or 
omissions by the defendant, usually in the statement of facts.  A court 
reviewing such a complaint must determine whether the plaintiff has 
actually pled a securities fraud claim despite labeling it as a state law 
cause of action, in which case SLUSA prevents the claim from 
proceeding.  This Part analyzes the different methods used by the U.S. 
courts of appeals to analyze the pleadings and to dispose of cases where 
SLUSA is deemed to apply. 
A. The Sixth Circuit’s “Literalist”64 Approach 
The Sixth Circuit interprets SLUSA’s “alleging a misrepresentation 
or omission” element broadly and literally to determine whether state 
law claims are barred by SLUSA.  In Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, the 
plaintiff brought a class action against Fifth Third Bank.  The plaintiff 
class consisted of beneficiaries of trust, estate, and fiduciary accounts 
for which the bank acted as a corporate fiduciary.65  In alleging breach 
of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff accused Fifth Third of (1) investing assets 
in proprietary mutual funds rather than superior funds operated by 
competitors; (2) promising that fiduciary accounts would receive 
“individualized” management, then breaching that agreement by 
“providing standardized and largely automated management” by 
“relatively inexperienced” and “low-level” employees; and (3) investing 
in too many low-yielding investments in order to cover the accounts’ tax 
liabilities.66  After the defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds of 
SLUSA preclusion, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to remove 
direct allegations of “misrepresentation,” “omissions,” and “schemes.”67  
The district court granted Fifth Third Bank’s motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, based on SLUSA.68 
 
 63. Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., No. 1:07-cv-348, 2008 WL 819290, at *3 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 
25, 2008). 
 64. This term was coined by Judge Posner in Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
 65. Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 66. Id.  The state law claims included breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and breach of 
contract, as well as individual claims brought by the class representative.  Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, 
N.A., No. 1:07-cv-348, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109776, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2008).  Federal 
jurisdiction was based on diversity.  Id. at *4. 
 67. Segal, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109776 at *8–9. 
 68. Segal, 581 F.3d at 308.  The district court stated, “A review of [the amended complaint] 
leads to the inescapable conclusion that Plaintiffs’ action is premised upon a central factual allegation: 
that Fifth Third misrepresented or failed to disclose material facts, and/or engaged in a manipulative or 
deceptive course of conduct . . . .”  Segal, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109776 at *9. 
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The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal.  Agreeing with the district court 
that the amended complaint alleged “misrepresentations, material 
omissions and manipulation,” the court was not convinced by the 
plaintiffs’ disclaimer to the contrary, which stated: “None of the causes 
of action stated herein are based upon any misrepresentation or failure to 
disclose material facts to plaintiffs . . . .”69 In rejecting this disclaimer, 
the court explained: 
Courts may look to—they must look to—the substance of a complaint’s 
allegations in applying SLUSA.  Otherwise, SLUSA enforcement would 
reduce to a formalistic search through the pages of the complaint for 
magic words—“untrue statement,” “material omission,” “manipulative or 
deceptive device”—and nothing more.  But a claimant can no more elude 
SLUSA’s prohibitions by editing out covered words from the complaint 
than by disclaiming their presence.  For the same reason a claimant does 
not have the broader authority to disclaim the applicability of SLUSA to a 
complaint, he cannot avoid its application through artful pleading that 
removes the covered words from the complaint but leaves in the covered 
concepts.70 
Under this approach, the court looked to “whether the complaint covers 
the prohibited theories,” not to whether it uses the “prohibited words.”71 
The Sixth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the state 
law claims did not depend on allegations of misrepresentation or 
omission, and that those allegations were thus not material.72  The court 
explained that SLUSA does not ask whether the allegations of 
misrepresentation are “material” to the state law claims, or whether the 
state law claims are “dependent” on those allegations; “it asks whether 
the complaint includes these types of allegations, pure and simple.”73 
 
 69. Segal, 581 F.3d at 309–11. 
 70. Id. at 310–11.  In addition to looking to the “substance” of the complaint, courts applying the 
literalist approach may look to external sources to determine the “essence” of the complaint.  See Dudek 
v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 295 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2002).  In Dudek, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in New 
York state court, pleading fraud and deceit, deceptive business practices, and negligent 
misrepresentation, among others, and alleged that the defendants “affirmatively” misled the plaintiffs 
into purchasing certain annuities. Id. at 879.  The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the complaint.  They 
then re-filed in Iowa state court, removing the allegations of fraud, misrepresentation and nondisclosure. 
Id.  The Eighth Circuit found that the “fact allegations in the two complaints are otherwise essentially 
the same,” and that the “essence of both complaints is [misrepresentation and non-disclosure].”  Id. at 
880 (emphasis added).  Thus, “in substance,” the Iowa state court complaint alleged misstatements and 
omissions in connection with purchase and sale of annuities.  Id. 
 71. Segal, 581 F.3d at 311. 
 72. Id. (emphasis added). 
 73. Id. (emphasis added). 
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B. The Ninth Circuit’s “Dismissal Without Prejudice” Approach 
The Ninth Circuit uses an approach similar to that of the Sixth 
Circuit.74  However, in Stoody-Broser v. Bank of America, the Ninth 
Circuit endorsed the procedure of dismissing a SLUSA-preempted 
complaint with leave to amend the complaint, thereby allowing the 
plaintiff to plead new claims not preempted by SLUSA.  In Stoody-
Broser, the plaintiff class consisted of thousands of trust beneficiaries 
administered by Bank of America.75  The plaintiffs alleged that the bank 
breached its fiduciary duty in the management of the trust accounts by 
investing in affiliated mutual funds, and that the bank’s administration 
of the accounts was compromised by a conflict of interest.76  Although 
the complaint did not explicitly reference misrepresentation or omission 
of material fact, the district court found that the plaintiffs had “framed 
the pleading” to avoid SLUSA preemption.77  Because the essence of the 
complaint was an allegation that the bank had misrepresented and 
omitted material facts regarding the bank’s conflicts of interest and 
expenses in managing the funds, the district court dismissed the claim 
without leave to amend.78 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal under SLUSA.79  It found that 
the complaint alleged omissions of material fact and deceptive practices 
in connection with the bank’s investment in affiliated mutual funds, and 
that fraudulent self-dealing was the “essence” of the claims.80  However, 
the court determined that the plaintiff should be permitted to amend the 
complaint.81  Recognizing the possibility of artful pleading through 
removal of particular claims or entire words, the court nonetheless 
believed it possible for the plaintiff to allege a breach of fiduciary duty 
“so long as the complaint does not allege, either expressly or implicitly, 
misrepresentations, omissions or fraudulent practices coincidental to the 
violation.”82 
 
 74. See Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127–29 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 75. Stoody-Broser v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 08-02705 JSW, 2009 WL 2707393, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 25, 2009), aff’d in part, 442 Fed. Appx. 247 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 76. Stoody-Broser, 2009 WL 2707393 at *2–3. 
 77. Id. at *3. 
 78. Id. at *5.  The district court explained its concern that “mere omission of key terms and 
references to omissions and fraudulent practices would be merely artful pleading, which would be 
improper.”  Id. 
 79. See Stoody-Broser, 442 Fed. Appx. at 249. 
 80. Id. at 248.  The court cited Ninth Circuit precedent holding that misrepresentation need not 
be an element of the claim to be precluded.  Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1222 
n.13 (9th Cir. 2009).  See also Dudek v. Prudential Sec., Inc.., 295 F.3d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(referring to “the essence” of the complaint in finding the claims preempted). 
 81. Stoody-Broser, 442 Fed. Appx. at 248. 
 82. Id. at 248–49. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (“[A] party may amend its pleading only with 
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Amendments to the complaint may allow the plaintiff to successfully 
avoid SLUSA preclusion even where the plaintiff has previously alleged 
fraud in the complaint.  In Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., Ameritrade offered 
a paid service that allowed subscribers to receive stock quotes in real 
time.83  The subscribers brought a class action against Ameritrade, 
claiming that the service did not actually offer real time information 
with respect to option quotes, and that subscribers to the service “[made] 
investment decisions to purchase or sell options based upon stale last 
sale information.”84  The complaint alleged state law claims for breach 
of contract, fraud by intentional misrepresentation, fraud by negligent 
representation, deceptive trade practices, and violation of the Nebraska 
Consumer Protection Act.85  The district court found that the action was 
preempted by SLUSA, but denied the motion to dismiss and gave the 
plaintiff thirty days to amend the complaint.86  The amended complaint 
removed all references to investors’ reliance on stale information and 
instead alleged that Ameritrade failed to provide subscribers with the 
price information it had promised in the subscription contract.87  The 
district court found that SLUSA did not preempt the action pled in the 
amended complaint, and remanded the case to state court.88 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit was convinced that the pleaded cause of 
action did not arise from a sale or purchase of a security in reliance on 
false information gained from the service.89  The court explained that 
 
the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.  The Court should freely give leave when 
justice so requires.”); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“If the underlying facts or 
circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an 
opportunity to test his claim on the merits” unless good reason exists for not granting leave). 
 83. Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 84. Id. at 594. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  In the Eighth Circuit, leave to file an amended complaint is at the discretion of the 
district court. See Dudek v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 295 F.3d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 2002).  In Dudek, the 
Eighth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file an 
amended complaint, because the plaintiffs failed to comply with local rules requiring the inclusion of a 
proposed amended pleading in their brief to the court on the removal and preemption issues, and failed 
to describe the changes they would make to avoid preemption.  Id. 
 87. Green, 279 F.3d at 594. 
 88. Id. at 594–95.  The original complaint alleged that Ameritrade falsely represented that the 
service provided real time and last-sale information to subscribers.  This reference to false 
representation was removed from the amended complaint.  Instead, the complaint merely alleged that 
Ameritrade had promised certain information to its subscribers and failed to provide it.  Id.  Thus, by 
removing the “magic words” of “misrepresentation,” the suit was placed outside the scope of SLUSA. 
Cf. Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 310–11 (6th Cir. 2009)  (“A claimant can no more 
elude SLUSA’s prohibitions by editing out covered words from the complaint than by disclaiming their 
presence.”). 
 89. Green, 279 F.3d at 598.  It should be noted that Green preceded the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
holding in Dabit, where the Court held that the phrase “in connection with the sale or purchase of a 
covered security” is to be construed broadly.  In Green, Ameritrade argued that consumers in general 
used the type of information provided by the real time quote service in question to purchase or sell 
13
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because the amended complaint completely omitted any reference to 
“purchase or sale” in reliance on that information, the complaint 
essentially alleged a breach of contract claim and not a securities fraud 
claim.90  The court rejected all of Ameritrade’s arguments regarding 
artful pleading.  Ameritrade first argued that the plaintiff had merely 
“changed [the] label” applied to his claim to “conveniently style[]” it as 
a breach of contract.91  The court disagreed, stating that the complaint 
omitted any reference to a sale or purchase92 and that his “prayer for 
relief does not rely on any alleged sale or purchase . . . .”93  Second, 
Ameritrade argued that the plaintiff “implicitly plead[ed] a 
misrepresentation claim” and attempted to avoid federal jurisdiction 
through artful pleading.94  The court explained that even if the amended 
complaint was an attempt at artful pleading, SLUSA could not apply 
anyway because of the failure to meet the “in connection with” 
element.95 
C. The Third Circuit’s “Factual Predicate” Test 
Instead of interpreting SLUSA’s “alleging a misrepresentation or 
omission” element literally, the Third Circuit takes a more nuanced 
approach which examines the relationship between the factual 
allegations and the right to relief.  In LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, the 
plaintiffs brought claims against Swiss banks for aiding and abetting a 
breach of fiduciary duty.96  The claim alleged that directors and officers 
 
securities, and that SLUSA therefore barred the suit even though the amended complaint did not suggest 
reliance on that information in connection with a purchase or sale of securities.  Id. at 597.  The Eighth 
Circuit held that the plaintiffs were non-sellers and non-purchasers, and therefore SLUSA could not 
apply. Id. at 598; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735–36 (1975) 
(holding that remedies in a § 10b or Rule 10b-5 class action are limited to purchasers or sellers of 
securities).  Based on the broad construction given to “in connection with the sale or purchase of a 
covered security” in Dabit, the Eighth Circuit’s SLUSA analysis may have ended more favorably for 
Ameritrade.  However, having disposed of this argument, the Eighth Circuit analyzes the amended 
complaint itself, providing a good example of the removal of “magic words” to avoid SLUSA 
preemption. 
 90. Green, 279 F.3d at 598.  The court explained, “[Green] alleges no sale or purchase of a 
covered security, only that he did not receive the type of information from Ameritrade for which he 
believed he had contracted and paid twenty dollars monthly.”  Id. 
 91. Id. at 599. 
 92. The court appeared to ignore Ameritrade’s argument that the essence of the plaintiff’s 
securities fraud claim was unchanged even though the label had changed.  The court was content to find 
that the mere omission to a “sale or purchase” was enough to change the complaint entirely.  Id. at 599.  
 93. Id.  This argument appears to be quite similar to the Third Circuit’s “factual predicate” 
analysis, discussed infra Part III(C). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  See supra note 88, for a discussion of how this case may have ended in a different result 
had it benefitted from Dabit’s broad construction of “in connection with.” 
 96. 519 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2008).  The elements of aiding and abetting liability for breach of 
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of a Delaware corporation had executed a “pump-and-dump” scheme 
whereby they artificially inflated the corporation’s stock values by 
misrepresenting the company’s financial situation.97  The named 
defendants, Swiss banks, allegedly knowingly assisted the directors in 
this scheme.98  The company’s stock price plummeted when the scheme 
was discovered.99  The complaint included claims based on Swiss 
money laundering laws which imposed duties on banks to properly 
investigate and freeze directors’ money laundering transactions.100  The 
defendant banks argued that the plaintiffs’ money laundering claims 
based on Swiss law were barred by SLUSA because, among other 
things, the Swiss law claims incorporated the allegations of the state law 
claims, which were themselves preempted by SLUSA.101  The district 
court dismissed all claims, finding them preempted by SLUSA because 
they all involved substantive allegations of misrepresentation in 
connection with securities trades.102 
However, the Third Circuit was not convinced that the state law 
claims were preempted.  It explained that the mere allegation of a 
misrepresentation does not automatically satisfy SLUSA’s element of a 
misrepresentation in connection with a securities trade.103  Rather, the 
allegation of misrepresentation must be a factual predicate to a claim—
meaning that the fact of misrepresentation “gives rise to liability, [and 
is] not merely an extraneous detail.”104  It explained: “This distinction 
[between factual predicates and extraneous details] is important because 
complaints are often filled with more information than is 
necessary . . . While it may be unwise . . . to set out extraneous 
allegations of misrepresentations in a complaint, the inclusion of such 
extraneous allegations does not operate to require that the complaint 
 
fiduciary are: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) knowing participation in that breach by the defendant; 
and (3) damages.  Id. at 131; see also Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1096 (Del. 2001).  The 
court explained that a “pump-and-dump” scheme gives rise to a claim for breach of the duty of loyalty.  
LaSala, 519 F.3d at 130.  It also gives rise to a potential claim under federal securities laws for 
rescission of purchase of stock, or for damages equal to the difference between the purchase price of the 
security and the actual value.  Id. 
 97. Id. at 126. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 139. 
 101. Id. at 138–41.  According to the complaint, the Swiss money laundering claims required, 
inter alia, a showing that the banks failed to conduct due diligence by verifying the customer’s identity, 
failed to investigate unusual or suspicious transactions, and failed to freeze assets in accounts with 
concealed owners.  Id. at 139.  By the Third Circuit’s interpretation, these claims did not depend on a 
finding of a state law breach of fiduciary duty; however, the Third Circuit left the final interpretation of 
the law to the district court on remand.  Id. at 139–42. 
 102. Id. at 141. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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must be dismissed under SLUSA.”105  Thus, although a plaintiff may not 
avoid SLUSA simply by arguing that misrepresentation or omission is 
not an element of the claim, the misrepresentation must be “one of a 
plaintiff’s necessary facts” in order to trigger SLUSA preemption.106 
The LaSala court compared the facts of the case to those of its earlier 
ruling in Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., where the plaintiff 
claimed breach of contract based on the defendant’s dissemination of 
“biased and materially misleading investment research” in violation of 
the parties’ services contract.107  There, the Third Circuit found that the 
claims were preempted, even though misrepresentation is not an element 
of breach of contract.108  The LaSala court distinguished by Rowinski by 
explaining that in Rowinski, the misrepresentation itself was the breach 
of contract.109  In other words, the Rowinski plaintiffs were required to 
prove a misrepresentation in order to prevail on their particular breach 
of contract claim, even though breach of contract generally does not 
involve an element of fraud.  The LaSala court explained that “when, as 
in Rowinski, a plaintiff alleges that a misrepresentation made in 
connection with a securities trade breaches a contract, the plaintiff 
cannot avoid SLUSA preemption by arguing that misrepresentation is 
not an element of a breach-of-contract action.”110 
Having distinguished Rowinski and clarified the factual predicate test, 
the LaSala court found that the allegations of misrepresentation in the 
complaint were “extraneous.”111  The directors’ alleged 
misrepresentations discussed in the complaint were not factual 
predicates to the Swiss money laundering claims because “they have no 
bearing on whether the Banks’ conduct is actionable . . . .”112  Instead, 
the misrepresentations constituted “background details” that the 
plaintiffs were not required to prove and did not need to allege in the 
complaint.113  The Third Circuit found the claims to be outside of 
SLUSA’s scope, vacated the district court’s order of dismissal, and 
 
 105. Id. at 141. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 398 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 108. Id. at 300. 
 109. LaSala, 519 F.3d at 141.  See also Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1176 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (“The failure to carry out a promise made in connection with a securities transaction is 
normally a breach of contract.  It does not constitute fraud unless, when the promise was made, the 
defendant secretly intended not to perform or knew that he could not perform.”). 
 110. LaSala, 519 F.3d at 141.  The Sixth Circuit in Segal argued that this explanation is dicta and 
that LaSala and Rowinski are actually in direct conflict.  Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 
311 (6th Cir. 2009).  But see Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that 
LaSala does not contradict Rowinski). 
 111. LaSala, 519 F.3d at 141. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
16
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/8
2012] COMMENT—SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 673 
remanded for further proceedings.114 
IV. DISCUSSION 
As demonstrated by these cases, both the facts stated in the complaint 
and the words used to describe them are largely dispositive of SLUSA 
preemption when SLUSA’s “misrepresentation or omission” element is 
at issue.  The disparate standards used by the circuit courts to analyze 
pleadings under SLUSA have the potential to create a forum-shopping 
problem for state law securities class actions.  Such forum shopping 
would undermine SLUSA’s objectives—namely, ending the federal 
flight loophole—and thus ultimately allow plaintiffs to avoid the strict 
requirements of the PSLRA.  To ensure that SLUSA is applied 
uniformly to preempt covered class actions, the federal courts have an 
interest in arriving at a uniform standard for analyzing securities class 
action complaints. 
The three approaches described in Part III—the Sixth Circuit’s 
literalist approach, the Ninth Circuit’s dismissal-without-prejudice 
approach, and the Third Circuit’s factual predicate test—must obviously 
be analyzed in light of their effectiveness in achieving SLUSA’s 
objectives of closing the federal flight loophole.  However, the Courts of 
Appeals must also keep in mind the important role that private securities 
litigation serves—allowing private citizens a role in pursuing corporate 
accountability and seeking appropriate remedies for private harms 
caused by violation of the federal securities regulations.  These 
competing objectives must be properly balanced in arriving at the ideal 
standard for analyzing securities class action complaints. 
The Third Circuit’s factual predicate test strikes an appropriate 
balance between preemption of state law based securities class actions 
according to congressional intent, and permitting some state law based 
claims to avoid removal and dismissal if the claims do not involve fraud.  
The test is a more nuanced way to determine the true nature of the suit 
and whether it is by nature a “securities fraud” class action.  By asking 
whether factual assertions form the actual basis for liability in the 
complaint, or whether the assertions are mere “extraneous detail,” the 
factual predicate test provides an appropriate means for determining 
whether a state law cause of action is really a fraud claim in disguise.  
By permitting some extraneous details of misrepresentation or omission, 
the factual predicate test allows the plaintiff more flexibility in telling its 
own story through assertions of fact in the pleadings.  In addition, by 
separating factual predicates from extraneous details, the approach 
 
 114. Id. at 143. 
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cautions a court against reading misrepresentations or omissions into the 
pleadings that do not actually exist or which are not essential to the 
case.115 
The factual predicate test does not risk preempting state law causes of 
action, such as breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty, that do not 
seek relief based on a  misrepresentation or omission.  This is consistent 
with the longstanding rule that Congress must expressly state its intent 
to eliminate state law causes of action in order for preemption to 
apply.116  Rather than “bring within the ambit of [Rule 10b-5] all 
breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities 
transaction,”117 the test is consistent with the lack of clear congressional 
intent to preempt state law claims that do not involve manipulation or 
deception.  Under the test, claims that are “in reality no more than 
ordinary state breach-of-contract claims-actions that lie outside the Act’s 
basic objectives”118 will be allowed to continue in state court, and true 
securities fraud claims—those that rely on proof of a misrepresentation 
or omission—will be screened out for dismissal in accordance with the 
objectives of SLUSA.  Because SLUSA was intended to preclude 
securities fraud class actions from being litigated in state court, it 
necessarily follows that what it prevents must be securities fraud claims, 
not breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty claims.119 
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit’s literal focus on “allegations” sweeps 
too broadly.  As the Seventh Circuit noted in Brown v. Calamos: 
everything in a complaint (except the request for relief) is an allegation in 
the sense that it is an assertion that has not been verified [by 
 
 115. See, e.g., Stephens v. Gentilello, 853 F. Supp. 2d 462, 468 (D.N.J. 2012).  In Stephens, 
defense counsel asked class members in depositions whether it was their contention that the defendant 
had intentionally lied to them. Id. at 368–71.  The defendant used the plaintiffs’ answers to these 
questions to argue that the claims were grounded in fraud and were thus barred by SLUSA. Id.  The trial 
court found that any statements by the deponents regarding misrepresentations were “the sort of 
background details that need to have been alleged, and need not be proved” in the suit for breach of 
contract, negligence, unjust enrichment, and violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, and thus 
those statements could not provide the basis for SLUSA removal.  Id.  See also Breakaway Solutions, 
Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., No. 19522, 2004 WL 1949300, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2004) 
(finding that defendants’ arguments regarding SLUSA preemption read facts into the complaint that 
were not present). 
 116. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (“Absent a clear indication 
of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations 
that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate 
regulation would be overridden.”). 
 117. Id. at 472. 
 118. Wharf Ltd. v. United Int’l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 596 (2001). 
 119. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980) (“[T]he 1934 Act cannot be read 
more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit.  Section 10(b) is aptly 
described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.”) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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litigation] . . . [y]et many of these assertions are not allegations in the 
sense of charges of misconduct for which the plaintiff is seeking relief.  If 
an allegation of fraud is included as background and unlikely to become 
an issue in the litigation, why should it doom the suit?120 
An excessively broad construction of SLUSA has the potential 
consequence of preempting certain causes of action that the statute was 
never intended to cover.  Because SLUSA was enacted in response to 
the “federal flight” problem, it follows that SLUSA should not preclude 
state law causes of action with a low risk of federal flight.121  A variety 
of state law claims involving wrongdoing other than fraud in connection 
with securities transactions are not generally the subject of extortionate 
“strike suits,” including breach of contract, breach of implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust 
enrichment, and indemnification.122  However, the stricter literalist 
approach to analyzing the pleadings may inadvertently cause such 
claims to be preempted, regardless of whether the state law cause of 
action is being used as a vehicle for asserting a fraud claim in disguise.  
Under the literalist approach, any allegation—whether explicit or 
implicit—that a corporation’s directors or agents omitted or 
misrepresented a fact within the complaint could have the unintended 
effect of preempting a breach of contract claim if such claim occurs 
within the same complaint.  The Sixth Circuit’s analysis therefore does 
not distinguish extraneous details included for “storytelling” purpose 
from those details that actually matter in forming the basis for the 
plaintiff’s requested relief. 
In spite of Dabit’s presumption that Congress intended for a broad 
construction of SLUSA,123 it is also clear that Congress did not intend to 
destroy all state law causes of action against corporations.  By 
 
 120. 664 F.3d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2774 (2012).  The Seventh Circuit 
adopted an approach that falls somewhere between the literalist approach of the Sixth Circuit and the 
factual predicate test of the Third Circuit.  The Seventh Circuit’s approach holds that the “suit is barred 
by SLUSA only if the allegations of the complaint make it likely that an issue of fraud will arise in the 
course of litigation.”  Id. at 128–29.  Thus, in Brown, the suit was barred where a fraud allegation would 
have been “difficult and maybe impossible to disentangle from the charge of breach of the duty of 
loyalty that the defendants owed their investors.”  Id. at 129.  See also Jorling v. Anthem, Inc., 836 F. 
Supp. 2d 821, 835 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (recognizing the circuit split over review of claims for SLUSA 
preemption and describing the Seventh Circuit’s approach as a “hybrid” standard). 
 121. See Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, 395 F.3d 25, 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (“SLUSA’s language and 
legislative history indicate no intent to preempt categories of state action that do not represent ‘federal 
flight’ litigation.”), rev’d on other grounds, Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006). 
 122. See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 258 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims in connection with initial public offering 
not preempted); Breakaway Solutions Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 19522, 2004 WL 1949300 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2004) (breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and indemnification not preempted by SLUSA). 
 123. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85. 
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incorporating existing language from Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act124 
and Rule 10b-5,125 SLUSA “employs terms with settled meaning under 
existing federal securities law” and “furthers the uniform application of 
federal fraud standards without expanding or constricting the substantive 
reach of federal securities regulation.”126  The Supreme Court has 
explained that not all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a 
securities transaction are within the reach of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; 
rather, only those breaches that involve fraudulent activity may be 
actionable under those rules.127  Reading those rules to include breaches 
of fiduciary duty not involving fraud “would bring within [Rule 10b-5] a 
wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation” 
and would “federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations” 
dealing with securities transactions, in the absence of clear 
congressional intent to do so.128  Thus, every Rule 10b-5 claim must 
actually involve “a deceptive device or fraud” to avoid “transform[ing] 
every breach of fiduciary duty into a federal securities violation.”129 
Yet, under the Sixth Circuit’s literalist approach, any reference in the 
complaint to a misrepresentation or omission would prevent a plaintiff 
from bringing a breach of fiduciary duty claim as a class action in state 
court, regardless of whether the misrepresentation or omission has any 
relationship to the breach of fiduciary duty claim.  In other words, a 
plaintiff class could never state “the directors failed to inform us of X” 
and in the same suit say “the directors breached their fiduciary duty on 
grounds completely unrelated to the failure to inform us of X.”  Such a 
result imputes a broader interpretation of “alleges a misrepresentation or 
omission” to Rule 10b-5 than was intended.  Because SLUSA 
incorporates case law interpreting Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s 
language regarding representations or omissions,130 the Sixth Circuit’s 
 
 124. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010). 
 125. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006) (“It shall be unlawful . . . (b) To make any untrue statement of 
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . .”). 
 126. Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005). See also Dabit, 
547 U.S. at 85 (explaining that Congress “imported” language from § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 into 
SLUSA’s core provision and thus probably intended for U.S. Supreme Court precedent interpreting the 
language in those rules to govern the interpretation of analogous language in SLUSA). 
 127. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1997). 
 128. Id. at 463–64. 
 129. S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 n.4 (2002). 
 130. See Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 299 (“Because SLUSA employs terms with settled meaning under 
existing federal securities law, Congress evidently intended to preempt those actions sufficiently 
‘connected’ to a securities transaction to be actionable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”); NRLB v. Amax 
Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) (“Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled 
meaning . . . a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate 
the established meaning.”). 
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literalist approach would extend SLUSA’s preemptive scope from the 
realm of securities transactions to reach ordinary breaches of fiduciary 
duty that were not the subject of strike suits, a result not within the 
contemplation of Congress in enacting the PSLRA and SLUSA. 
Furthermore, if a court finds that the allegation of misrepresentation 
or omission in the complaint precludes a particular claim, it is not clear 
what should happen to other claims within the same complaint.  The 
circuits are split as to whether SLUSA preempts individual claims or 
entire actions.131  If the Sixth Circuit’s literalist approach is used in a 
circuit that also interprets SLUSA to preempt the entire action rather 
than just the claim, enormous problems could arise.  As one court 
explained, “it does not make sense that Congress would intend to bar 
legitimate claims simply because they are brought under the umbrella of 
a lawsuit containing some SLUSA-preempted state law claims.”132  
However, that is the result commanded by the literalist approach.  By 
ignoring whether misrepresentations or omissions actually form the 
factual predicate for liability for each individual claim, and instead 
focusing on whether the complaint “includes these types of allegations, 
pure and simple . . .,”133 this approach would tend to preclude a wide 
range of state law claims, or in extreme cases, preempt every claim in 
the complaint.  This is especially likely after Dabit’s pronouncement 
that the “in connection with [purchase or sale of securities]” element is 
to be interpreted broadly, covering those allegations of fraud that merely 
“coincide” with a securities transaction.134  Thus, a plaintiff seeking to 
join multiple state law claims against an issuer in a circuit that 
recognizes preemption of entire actions rather than individual claims 
must avoid any minor mention of facts resembling misrepresentation or 
omission.135  Furthermore, plaintiffs might be tempted to avoid this 
 
 131. Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 898, 905 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(recognizing a split of authority as to “whether a district court may sever claims that do not allege 
misrepresentation or must dismiss the action as a whole.”); Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 
F.3d 1208, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (“SLUSA does not require the dismissal of non-precluded claims along 
with precluded claims.”); Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, 395 F.3d 25, 47 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d on other 
grounds, 547 U.S. 71 (2006) (remanding SLUSA-preempted claims for dismissal without prejudice and 
reversing dismissal of non-preempted claims); In re Lord Abbett Mutual Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 
255–56 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 132. Crimi v. Barnholt, No. C-08-02249 CRB, 2008 WL 4287566, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 
2008). 
 133. Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 134. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85. 
 135. Consider, for example, a breach of fiduciary duty claim in which the plaintiff class alleges a 
breach of the directors’ duty of loyalty, based on a director’s conflict of interest where the director failed 
to inform others of such conflict.  In addition to those claims, the complaint raises a totally separate 
claim alleging that because of some other unrelated misconduct by the board of directors, the 
shareholder class members were wrongfully induced into holding onto their shares instead of selling 
them.  Because the complaint would necessarily include both a securities transaction and a statement to 
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result by splitting claims between multiple lawsuits—with one 
complaint alleging extraneous details of misrepresentation or omission 
as background and the other complaint avoiding all mention of those 
facts.136  Such an attempt to split claims between state and federal court 
in order to avoid preemption of purely state law claims would present a 
problem of parallel litigation that the PSLRA intended to eliminate in 
the first place.137  Ultimately, a finding that SLUSA preempts entire 
actions simply because the complaint alleges “extraneous details” of 
fraud would expand SLUSA’s reach beyond a desirable scope—to 
preempt causes of action that are not by their nature securities fraud 
claims.  Although preemption of entire actions may deter plaintiffs’ 
attorneys from testing the boundaries of SLUSA’s preemption of state 
law claims, there is no evidence that Congress intended such a punitive 
effect.138 
While the literalist approach goes too far in preempting claims, the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach swings too far in the opposite direction.  By 
letting plaintiffs amend the pleadings following a dismissal without 
prejudice, this approach allows a plaintiff’s case to proceed even after 
the plaintiff has expressed a clear intent to introduce allegations of fraud 
into the lawsuit. 
 On purely procedural grounds, the Ninth Circuit’s approach is highly 
problematic.  Although some authority suggests that allowing the 
 
the effect of, “Director X failed to inform the company of his conflict of interest,” the state law breach of 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty would be preempted by SLUSA in a jurisdiction that considers SLUSA to 
bar entire actions rather than individual claims.  See, e.g., Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (explaining that a misleading omission is implicitly alleged by an assertion that an issuer 
failed to disclose a conflict of interest that would have affected potential investors’ decision to invest in 
certain funds).  The success or failure of a breach of the duty of loyalty does not—and cannot—revolve 
around whether the defendant failed to disclose a conflict of interest because “that duty is not dissolved 
by disclosure, ” and because “no sane investor would knowingly put himself at the mercy of a disloyal 
investment manager” anyways.  Id. at 129; accord RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 390 cmt. C 
(1933) (The fact that the agent discloses that he is acting as an adverse party “does not relieve him from 
the duty of giving the principal impartial advice based upon a carefully formed judgment as to the 
principal’s interests.”).  Thus, although an allegation that a director failed to disclose a conflict of 
interest would not have any bearing on a breach of duty of loyalty claim, it would still operate to bring 
the claim within the scope of SLUSA. 
 136. In re Lord Abbett Mutual Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir 2009).  In Lord 
Abbett, the Third Circuit even suggested that plaintiffs could split claims amongst multiple actions to 
allow claims clearly outside the scope of SLUSA to go through and to lump potentially preempted state 
law claims together in a separate action.  Id.  Although it is unclear how such procedural maneuvering 
would not violate basic principles of res judicata, it is more than likely that neither Congress nor the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Dabit intended to endorse “claim splitting,” either directly or indirectly, by 
intending a broad construction of SLUSA. 
 137. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 86–87 (explaining that the prospect of parallel class actions 
proceeding in state court and federal court “squarely conflicts with the congressional preference for 
national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 138. Lord Abbett, 553 F.3d at 255. 
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plaintiff to amend the complaint is proper when it is possible for the 
plaintiff to assert a claim outside SLUSA’s preemptive scope,139 the 
approach may violate the forum manipulation rule.140  This rule states 
that where a case has been removed to federal court, the plaintiff may 
not seek remand by eliminating the factual prerequisites for federal 
subject matter jurisdiction by amending the complaint.141  Some circuit 
courts that have recognized a right to amend the complaint to avoid 
SLUSA preemption do not address the forum manipulation rule in this 
context.  In U.S. Mortgage v. Saxton, the Ninth Circuit justified this 
approach by pointing out “the inequity of dismissing otherwise valid and 
viable state law claims on the ground that plaintiff pled—perhaps 
inadvertently—a cause of action that may be construed as federal in 
nature.”142  Recognizing that SLUSA includes no express prohibition 
against amendment and that the case law was silent on the issue, the 
grant or denial of leave to amend claims preempted by SLUSA are 
properly left to the discretion of the district courts.143  However, some 
circuits have held that where a district court has subject matter 
jurisdiction at the time of removal, subsequent acts do not defeat 
jurisdiction.144 
 
 139. FED. R. CIV. P. 15; Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“If the underlying facts or 
circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an 
opportunity to test his claim on the merits” unless good reason exists for not granting leave.). 
 140. Brown, 664 F.3d at 131. 
 141. The forum manipulation rule was recognized in St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab 
Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938) (holding that remand to state court was improper when plaintiff amended the 
complaint to claim damages below the jurisdictional amount).  See also Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United 
States, 549 U.S. 457, 474 n.6 (“When a defendant removes a case to federal court based on the presence 
of a federal claim, an amendment eliminating the original basis for federal jurisdiction generally does 
not defeat jurisdiction.”).  But see Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 356 n.12 (1988) 
(explaining that St. Paul should not be read to require that forum manipulation concerns necessitate a 
blanket prohibition on remands when federal jurisdiction is inherently discretionary). 
 142. 494 F.3d 833, 843 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1094 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court’s 
denial of motion to remand after plaintiff amended complaint to delete claims and allegations that might 
be deemed to fall within the scope of SLUSA); Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 
Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the amended complaint in a securities class 
action could not support remand because “jurisdiction must be analyzed on the basis of the pleadings 
filed at the time of removal without reference to subsequent amendments,” and thus “a plaintiff cannot 
compel remand by amending a complaint to eliminate the federal question upon which removal was 
based.”); Freeport–McMoran, Inc. v. KN Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991); Doddy v. Oxy USA, 
Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 456 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[C]hanges after removal cannot eliminate jurisdiction and 
require remand.”); Van Meter v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1 F.3d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[I]f a 
district court determines subject matter jurisdiction to have existed at the time of removal, yet remands 
for alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on some post-removal event(s),” the remand order 
does not arise under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) and is only reviewable upon a writ of mandamus.).  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(c) (2011) states, “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”  This provision refers to subject matter 
jurisdiction as it exists at the time of removal.  Van Meter, 1 F.3d at 450.  In light of the foregoing 
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The Ninth Circuit’s approach would allow plaintiffs to remove 
references to misrepresentation or omission in order to obtain a remand 
to state court, where they may attempt to reintroduce them.145  From the 
outset, the plaintiff’s attorney seeks to adduce enough facts to not only 
plead a proper claim, but also to paint a persuasive picture of corporate 
wrongdoing as well.  In his critique of the Ninth Circuit’s approach, 
Judge Posner explained, “[the plaintiff] must have thought the 
allegations [of fraud] added something to his case, as why else had he 
made them?”146  This approach naively disregards the possible 
motivation for plaintiffs’ attorneys, having had their case remanded to 
state court after amending the complaint, to continue to present a case of 
securities fraud despite not having formally brought one in the 
pleadings.147  Thus, like the Sixth Circuit’s literalist approach, the Ninth 
Circuit’s overly formalistic concept of what it means to plead a 
securities fraud case creates an easy out for plaintiffs’ attorneys who 
wish to present a case of fraud—or at least facts suggesting fraud—in 
state court. 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit’s approach imposes no standards of 
accountability and may reduce the act of pleading to a chaotic trial and 
error process.  Stoody-Broser did not explain whether a plaintiff may 
amend the complaint multiple times until properly pleading a claim that 
can avoid SLUSA preemption, or whether a plaintiff only gets one shot 
at amendments.  Given the risk of further delays caused by amending 
and re-filing the complaint, as well as the increased costs of prolonged 
litigation, allowing a plaintiffs’ attorney a second chance—or third, or 
fourth, and so on—to amend the complaint until all SLUSA-preempted 
allegations are effectively removed would undermine one of the main 
policy rationales of the PSLRA, namely reducing the extortionate effect 
of securities litigation whereby corporations were encouraged to settle 
out to avoid the costs and hassle of costly and protracted litigation of 
 
authority, it is not clear that allowing the plaintiff to amend the complaint to remove allegations of 
misrepresentation or omission would have the legal effect of depriving the federal court of subject 
matter jurisdiction, if such jurisdiction existed before the amended complaint. 
 145. Brown, 664 F.3d at 128. 
 146. Id.  Judge Posner’s “hybrid” standard for reviewing claims for SLUSA preemption addresses 
the likelihood that allegations of fraud will become an issue at trial.  See supra note 125. 
 147. Even in a case that has properly avoided SLUSA preemption and remained in state court, a 
plaintiff’s attorney may be tempted to present allegations of misrepresentation or omission as a matter of 
trial strategy.  See Allan Kanner & Tibor L. Nagy, Legal Strategy, Storytelling and Complex Litigation, 
30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 11–12 (2006) (“Complex litigation typically involves highly intricate legal 
and scientific issues . . . .  [T]o successfully press the human appeal of her client’s claims, the [lawyer] 
presents her cases through the framework of a story.  Her stories are infused with concrete facts, they 
appeal to emotion and common sense, and they appear at all stages of her cases, presenting themselves 
in her complaint and emerging as persistent themes in all of her arguments and briefs.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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what tended to be baseless claims of securities fraud.  Because “a lawyer 
who files a securities suit and should know about SLUSA and ought to 
be able to [avoid pleading fraud],”148 dismissal without prejudice 
provides too easy of a way out. 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit’s intermediate approach is incapable of 
closing the federal flight loophole.  It provides far too much leeway for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to assert claims of misrepresentation or omission—
thereby essentially pleading a federal claim, according to SLUSA—in 
state court, and then to simply remove those allegations in the event that 
the federal district court finds those claims to be preempted once the 
case is removed.  Allowing plaintiffs’ attorneys to test the waters like 
this would greatly undermine SLUSA’s objectives.149  
Despite the shortcomings of the Ninth Circuit’s approach, it helps to 
show the need for a resolution of the circuit split.  If the standard for 
analyzing complaints with allegations of fraud were clear, plaintiffs who 
pleaded incorrectly and fell into SLUSA’s trap would have a less 
sympathetic case for seeking leave to amend.  A clearer standard for 
analyzing the pleadings would place plaintiffs’ attorneys on notice and 
encourage them to draft the complaint carefully to avoid preemption. 
V. CONCLUSION 
SLUSA was enacted to prevent circumvention of the PSLRA, making 
federal courts “the exclusive venue for most securities class action 
lawsuits.”150  The development of a circuit split regarding the 
appropriate scope of SLUSA preemption undermines the uniform 
standards that the PSLRA and SLUSA were intended to achieve.  It is 
essential that the federal courts resolve this circuit split so that 
defendants are not subjected to the varying laws of multiple states when 
sued for securities fraud, and so that plaintiffs can know with more 
certainty exactly where the limits of federal preemption lie when they 
plead facts suggesting a misrepresentation or omission in a suit brought 
under state law causes of action. 
But in their differing approaches to determining what exactly 
constitutes a “fraud” case, the circuit courts have fallen into two traps.  
On one hand, the Sixth Circuit’s approach results in preemption of state 
law causes of action even when the plaintiff has not used state law 
“labels” to disguise the true nature of what is essentially a securities 
fraud claim.  On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit’s approach ignores the 
 
 148. Brown, 664 F.3d at 128. 
 149. See id. (“A lawyer who files a securities suit should know about SLUSA and ought to be able 
to control the impulse to embellish his securities suit with a charge of fraud.”). 
 150. H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 8 (1998). 
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risk of artful pleading and forum manipulation, and undermines 
SLUSA’s loophole-closing objectives by allowing plaintiffs a second 
chance after having pled claims that are clearly within SLUSA’s 
preemptive scope.  The Third Circuit’s factual predicate test strikes an 
appropriate balance between these two extremes.  By determining 
whether allegations of misrepresentation or omission form the factual 
predicate for liability under the causes of action asserted by the plaintiff, 
the Third Circuit discerns between mere “extraneous details” and facts 
that actually convert the nature of the suit from a basic state law claim to 
a securities fraud claim.  This more nuanced approach to dealing with 
plaintiffs’ attempts to work around SLUSA is best suited to achieve 
SLUSA’s objectives, federal courts who seek to resolve the circuit split 
are advised to take the middle path and adopt the Third Circuit’s factual 
predicate test. 
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